CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE
CANADIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM
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A retired Canadian cabinet minister, speaking at a departmental seminar at
McGill University last year, asked the question "Why does federal-provincial conflict in Canada loom so large in contrast to federal-state conflict in the United
States?" The simple answer to that question was that the separation of powers in
the United States diffuses power-between the President and the Congress, between governors and state legislatures-in such a way that any conflict which
takes place is widely distributed throughout the system. In Canada the system of
cabinet government concentrates power in the executive-the Prime Minister and
Cabinet in Ottawa and the provincial premiers and their cabinets in their respective provinces. In this way, the conflict is focused on a small universe of more or
less monolithic actors. The fact that there are only ten provinces in Canada as
against fifty states in the United States may also have a bearing on the intensification of the conflict. The difference in the systems of government-congressional
on the one hand and the Westminster model on the other-has a great deal to do
with the focus and resolution of conflicts in the two systems. In Canada the two
principal institutions for conflict management-the courts and intergovernmental
negotiation-differ considerably from their counterparts in the United States.
I
Is

FEDERALISM INCONSISTENT WITH THE WESTMINSTER MODEL?

Canada is not the only country which has attempted to marry a parliamentary
system of government with federalism. Australia has done the same thing, and a
number of other countries within the British Commonwealth have followed suit.
Over eighty years ago the founders of the Australian federal system were seriously
concerned with whether the two systems could be united, and some wondered
whether either federalism or the Westminster system would prevail to the exclusion of the other system.' In the case of Australia, the fear was that the elected
Senate would be capable of destroying a government with a stable majority in the
lower house, and something like this happened in 19752 The essence of the Westminster system is that the executive has the authority to govern as long as it is
supported by a majority in the popularly elected lower house, and is thus responsible to it. If a second chamber representing a different constituency-the states as
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such--can bring government to a standstill by refusing to pass appropriations, the
stability and workability of the system is at risk.
This has so far not been the problem in Canada because the Canadian Senate
is a nonelective body which has used its powers with circumspection. The incompatibility of the two systems has emerged elsewhere in the form of conflicts between the provinces and the central government which no existing institutions in
the political system seem to be able to resolve. This sort of conflict may well be
visible in Australia as well.
One of the obvious features of the Westminster system was what Walter Bagehot called "the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers." '3 This has meant that a government, once confirmed in power by a
general election, can count as long as that parliament lasts on the strict discipline
of its majority in the House to free it from the risk that its proposals will be modified by the legislature. This is a tremendous concentration of power only mitigated by the extent to which an opposition can frustrate a government by delaying
tactics. Governments in the Westminster system are not only groups of politicians
who command and wish to enhance great resources of political power, but also
bureaucracies which have their own reasons for aggrandizing the jurisdiction of
their bureaucratic empires. In a federal state the distribution of legislative power
describes the boundary line within which governments and legislatures are circumscribed by the constitution. Thus the governments at the two levels are engaged in
perpetual conflict over the placement of the boundary. Increasing demands on
government as a result of changing social values result in a need to decide which
level of government should deliver the services in question.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS

Constitutional adjustment, in its broadest sense, involves the incorporation of
important changes in community values into the legal and governmental system.
When a constitution imposes no barriers this change may take place simply
through legislative change. 4 In federal systems the constitution, to an extent frozen in the values of the age in which it was written, may impose barriers to such
substantial changes. Appropriate policy changes may only be possible by a change
in the distribution of power between the levels of government. To accomplish this
by the painful and uncertain method of constitutional amendment may be either
long delayed or impossible. An alternative method, as Dicey pointed out, is for the
courts to articulate authoritatively a new constitutional adjustment.
That a federal system again can flourish only among communities imbued with a legal
spirit and trained to reverence the law is as certain as can be any conclusions of political
speculation. Federalism substitutes litigation for legislation, and none but a law-fearing
people will be inclined to regard the decision of a suit as equivalent to the enactment of a
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Thus, in Canada, as in the United States, the courts are the fulcrum of constitutional change. In any process of change there are winners and losers. Changes
in political ideas push their way through the political process to drive governments
to enact laws which adversely affect vested interests of one group or another. If
these be powerful economic interests they are likely to be overwhelmed in the end
by the democratic process, but their powers of resistance are not exhausted. They
have the financial resources to fight long battles in the courts, ostensibly in defense
6
of constitutional principle, to defeat laws they find repulsive.
There are, however, significant differences between the Constitutions of Canada and the United States which provide different strategies to the actors. One
difference is the existence in the United States of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, and its absence (at least so far) in Canada. Thus in the United States vested
interests on the defensive, or citizens' groups seeking their objectives when normal
political means have failed, can involve the courts in order to restrain under the
Bill of Rights the enforcement of laws they do not like. This expedient is, on the
whole, not possible in Canada where the only litigious ground is legislative jurisdiction. That is why it was necessary to fight the wartime and post-war treatment
of Japanese Canadians solely on the ground of whether the Parliament of Canada
possessed such jurisdiction under emergency legislation.7 Similarly, a long line of
civil liberties cases in Quebec had to be fought on the ground that the province
8
was invading the criminal law power of Parliament.
In Canada the great conflict over the jurisdiction of the two levels of government seems to have died down after the Second World War. The reason for this
was twofold. First, the war and postwar economy had led to much closer relationships between the board rooms of the great corporations and governments. The
managers of these corporations were less likely to be closeted with their legal advisers seeking to upset legislation and more likely to be seeking benefits from governments. Unable to beat the big battalions in the courts, they now preferred to work
with them for mutual advantage. Second, the courts also affected this decline. In
the prewar years courts had been much more inclined to find against legislation
which they did not like, but later became more accommodating to the growing
requirements of the modern state in regulating the economy, whether that state
took the form of a provincial legislature or of the Parliament of Canada. In the
process they had escaped from the "watertight compartment" view of the distribution of legislative powers and had come to cast a benevolent eye on legislation in
fields of overlapping jurisdiction which sought to achieve a unified system of control through administrative delegation of enforcement power from one sovereign
legislature to the agents of the other. A classic case is Prince Edward Island Potato
Marketing Boardv. HB. Wilh's, Inc. ,9 which permitted the government of Canada to
5.
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"adopt as its own" a provincial marketing board for the purpose of enforcing the
regulation of interprovincial and international trade in an agricultural commodity.
The development of a large number of jointly financed and jointly administered programs in such fields as social security and public health were the result of
federal initiatives in fields that were wholly. or partly in provincial jurisdiction.
This neatly avoided the apparent constitutional barrier against the achievement of
common programs and common standards which applied throughout the country. 0 That constitutional barrier had, in the prewar years, seemed insuperable. If
such programs were to apply generally across the country a constitutional amendment to transfer such a large area of jurisdiction from the provinces to the federal
government could never have commanded sufficient political support to make it
possible, while an alternative under which the provinces might delegate jurisdiction to the federal parliament was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada. I
Thus, the federal-provincial conference became the major innovation in the
Canadian federal system during the postwar years. This wholly informal and extraconstitutional device took many forms. At the summit of the process is the First
Ministers' Conference. This body, presided over by the Prime Minister, includes
all of the provincial premiers. The principal participants are usually accompanied
by their Ministers of Intergovernmental Affairs, other ministers if the subject warrants, and the normal bevy of civil service advisers. There are also regular meetings of ministers covering particular fields. Such meetings are usually supported
by continuing meetings of officials to deal with more technical topics and prepare
the ground for further ministerial meetings.
What are the outcomes of all these meetings which consume thousands of manhours? A vast range of matters of joint concern to the two levels of government are
discussed and bargained over, from constitutional amendments, tax-sharing, and
the joint funding of shared programs, to the reconciliation of legal norms. A striking characteristic of this phenomenon is that a wide range of public policy issues is
worked out through the process of secret negotiation and then presented to Parliament and the provincial legislatures in agreed form for ratification, so that the
normal legislative process of debate and open compromise is replaced by agreements which are no longer negotiable by the time they become public. 12 This
system of executive federalism, as it is called, has had the effect of vastly strengthening the executive at the expense of the legislature, and the significance of this has
not been lost on those who publicly mourn the decline in the influence and role of
Parliament.
What were the perceived advantages in the procedure? It did make possible
10. Reference Re Weekly Rest In Industrial Undertakings Act, Minimum Wages Act and Limitation
of Hours of Work Act, [19371 1 D.L.R. 673. Lord Atkin stated that under the scheme of the British North
America Act, there were to be "water-tight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure." Id at 684.
11. Attorney Gen. of N. S. v. Attorney Gen. of Can., [1951] Can. S. Ct. 31.
12. See generaly R. SIMEON, FEDERAL PROVINCIAL DIPLOMACY (1972); D. SMILEY, CANADA IN QUESTION: FEDERALISM IN THE EIGHTIES (1980).

Page 231: Summer 1981]

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN CANADA

solutions to problems created by the need to fit modern demands on the state into
a constitutional framework designed in the very different conditions of the
nineteenth century. The essence of the problem was that only the federal government had the fiscal resources to support such programs, which were beyond the
means of all but the richest provinces, and totally beyond the means of most provinces, even though the constitutional division of powers placed these matters wholly in provincial hands. A tolerable result could be achieved by intergovernmental
cooperation without the trauma and frustration of seeking a constitutional amendment. Resort to the courts to find a solution to jurisdictional difficulties, on the
other hand, had all of the characteristics of a zero-sum game, which neither party
was prepared to risk.
One of the most striking of these developments was a change in the balance of
sophistication between the two levels of government. At the beginning of the period the federa! government had emerged from the war with a large, experienced
and expert bureaucracy to support policy innovation and implementation by ministers. All provinces, without exception, came out of the war with small, old-fashioned bureaucratic structures unable to match their federal counterparts in
knowledge, and in this case clearly knowledge led to power. The mere necessity of
developing the accounting and control procedures sufficient to manage programs
up to federal standards was enough to bring about an improvement in the administrative capacity of the provinces. It was only the next step for the provinces to
perceive that the bulk of their own resources were being committed to suit federal
priorities in programs funded by matched grants.' 3 As the provinces built up their
own staffs of experts they became more capable of bargaining with their federal
counterparts on equal intellectual terms. By the time of the negotiation over the
Canada Pension Plan in 1963 and 1964, the provincial experts were clearly better
prepared than their federal counterparts and succeeded in radically altering the
original federal proposal. This growth in provincial bureaucratic capability
should not be underestimated as a major factor in the decentralization of the Canadian federal system in the last two decades.
The system of federal adjustment by negotiation became so pervasive that it
appeared to be displacing the courts as the chief mechanism of adjustment in the
system. The figures for constitutional cases before the supreme court are illustrative. "From 1950 ...to 1974, the Supreme Court of Canada disposed of fifty-nine
constitutional cases, an average of only 2.5 a year. Since 1975 it has risen somewhat."' 4 The reason in part was a distrust of the court by some (perhaps most)
provincial governments. The Supreme Court of Canada is not entrenched in the
Constitution, but created by Parliament by virtue of section 101 of the British
North America Act (B.N.A.)i5 which enables it to "provide for the Constitution,
Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada." What
13. For example, federal policies committed very large resources in the early period to improvements
in health care, leaving the provinces with inadequate funds to deal with education, which for political
reasons was not a federal priority.
Supreme Court of Canada, 3 CAN. U.S. L.J 39, 44 (1980).
14. Hogg,Jurisditimn of the Cort."77Te
15. The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter cited as B.N.A. ACT].

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 44: No. 3

Parliament has created, it could presumably enlarge, modify, or destroy without
reference to the provinces. The judges of the court are appointed by the federal
Cabinet, without the necessity of any provincial participation in the process, or
16
any ratification procedure. This makes the authority of the court suspect. Provincial politicians distrust a court made up of judges wholly appointed by their
adversary in constitutional conflict and such suspicion undermines the authority of
7
the court in making decisions generally accepted as final and binding.'
Intergovernmental bargaining as an alternative to resort to the courts as a way
of managing conflict has been successful in a number of situations where inappropriate jurisdictional boundaries prevented the implementation of generally agreed
upon programs, for example, in creating universally accessible programs of health
and hospital care and pensions for the aged. However, a grave problem has been
created for the federal government by making the provinces the effective administrative agencies of programs for which the federal authorities have a major and
increasing financial responsibility. The real growth of the economy has come almost to a dead stop, while costs due to inflation are rising, thus pushing up the
federal deficit. Controling this deficit is almost impossible when approximately 57
percent of federal expenditure is committed to statutory obligations, the major
components of which are established fiscal transfer programs and debt charges.
Most fiscal and tax transfer programs are negotiated with the provinces on a five
year basis and many of the major ones expire in 1982. Severe federal retrenchment would transfer heavier burdens to the provinces and threaten chaos to many
established programs. This adds greatly to the atmosphere of tension and unease
in all current federal-provincial negotiations.
There is a further difficulty with the system of federal adjustment by negotiation which has been described by the generic name of executive federalism. When
it has worked in the past, the interests of the two levels of government were complementary. They shared the same objectives and could agree on the best policy
and adminstrative outcome. It simply will not work when their objectives are not
congruent, and no one should expect it to do so. It is likely that divergent federal
and provincial interests will emerge in the 1980s. Probable areas of divergence
include a policy on the control of foreign investment, a common industrial strategy, and particularly energy and resource problems.
III
THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE

The constitutional debate which has dominated the Canadian scene for the
past year involves all of the factors discussed above. It involves fundamental conflicts of value, both in the way the Constitution has and should recognize the position of French Canadians, and the relative positions of legislatures and courts in
16.

One commentator has argued, however, that such suspicion is unwarranted. W. LEDERMAN,

CONTINUING CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS 203 (1981).

17. See Mallory, Constraintson Courtsas Agencies of ConstitutionalChange., The Canadian Case, 1977 PUB. L.
404, 425-26.
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the final determination of community values; it involves a struggle over which
level of government under the Constitution should control the economic destiny of
the regions of Canada. Useful constitutional debates hinge on agreement about
the rules governing the determination of ultimate values and about the location of
political power.
A number of issues have converged and have become inextricably intermingled. Patriation is a Canadian neologism which refers to the process of actually
bringing the Canadian Constitution to Canada. Since the creation of the Canadian federation in 1867, the basic Canadian document has been the B.N.A. Act-a
statute of the British Parliament. One of the lacunae in that Act was the possibly
deliberate omission of a general amending power, though it has always been true
that some parts of the Constitution could be amended in Canada.
A great deal is at stake in deciding who is involved in this process. In issues
which did not affect the powers of the provinces under the Constitution, the historic practice was for a joint resolution of the Senate and the House of Commons
to request the British Parliament to act by bringing about the necessary amendment. Where provincial powers were concerned, it had become customary to consult with and secure agreement from all of the provinces before the Canadian
Parliament proceeded to seek an amendment. Whether this had become a rigid
convention of the Constitution was a matter of some disagreement among the authorities. One thing is clear. The Statute of Westminster of 1931,1 which removed all constitutional limitations on the sovereignty of the British Dominions,
would have given legal force to the established convention that the British Parliament would not pass any law affecting them except with their consent and at their
request. This would have apparently transferred the power to amend the B.N.A.
Act to the Parliament of Canada. Resultant objection from provincial governments led the Canadian government to secure a clause in the Statute of Westminster 19 exempting the B.N.A. Acts from the effect of the Statute. It was assumed
that in due course, agreement in Canada on an amending formula would be found
and the liberation of Canada from this form of British tutelage would be achieved.
So far no formula has been found. Meanwhile, what is the role of the British
Parliament? Has it the moral and constitutional right to look behind the form to
the substance of a request of the Canadian Parliament, or is its role purely formal
and automatic? That is what part of the debate is about.
There have been numerous attempts to reach agreement on an amending
formula so that the final constitutional link with the British Parliament could be
cut and the Canadian Constitution reasserted in purely Canadian form. All of
these attempts have failed. In one case, the federal-provincial conference of first
ministers at Victoria, British Columbia, in 1971, tentative agreement of all governments concerned was actually achieved, only to have this agreement repudiated by
Quebec after the Premier had returned to his native province.
The Quebec problem was, and is, one of the keys to the difficulty. The modern18.
19.
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ization of Quebec society, particularly since the 1960s, has made it more urgent to
define explicitly the special position of Quebec in the Constitution. The B.N.A.
Act did so only in relation to the civil law in that province and the equality of the
French and English languages in the legislatures and courts of Quebec and Canada. Modern governments with ever increasing demands to assume responsibility
for cultural and social matters require more than that. In the case of Quebec the
sensitive areas have been social policy and communications. All of this, of course,
was brought to a head with the election of a separatist government in Quebec in
1976 and the Quebec Referendum on negotiation of "sovereignty-association" for
that province in 1980. In the course of the referendum debate, urgent promises of
"constitutional renewal" were made by the proponents of the "no" vote. Having
won, with almost 60 percent of the votes, they would have to be under an obligation to deliver. Accordingly, a series of urgent prelimiary negotiations took place
between federal and provincial ministers over the summer to prepare for a summit
of first ministers in September. The preparatory negotiations seemed to make substantial progress. The summit failed. To understand this failure, it is imporant to
look at the issues as perceived by the principal protagonists. Years of refinement of
the Westminster system, coupled with the long-standing format of executive federalism, meant that the first ministers alone had the political power to settle the
question. If they settled it, no legislature would have ventured to contradict them.
For a majority of provincial first ministers the focus of the issues was not Quebec, but increased powers over their provincial economies. This was a particularly
acute issue for the four Western provinces, the majority of which had resourcebased prosperity which, in the case of oil and minerals, was of course a rapidly
wasting asset. Could they use their new wealth to build an industrial base in the
West and challenge the historic pattern of the Canadian economy? The concentration of population and industry in Ontario and Quebec had meant that Western raw materials and agricultural production were financed and processed in the
East. A combination of what the Australians call "numbers" (population and thus
majority domination of Parliament and the Cabinet) and economic power had
produced what the political economists see as the classic metropolis-periphery dependency relationship. The provincial premiers from the periphery represented
regions that were politically weak in Ottawa, but at the summit conference they
had the numbers and the bargaining power in a situation whch was customarily
governed by consensus.
Buoyed by poll results and bound by their own promises, the federal politicians
decided to move ahead on constitutional reform without provincial agreement. In
large measure this was the result of the determination of Prime Minister Trudeau
himself-a man of limited patience with people whom he regards as unreasonable.
What are the constitutional implications of his action? As the Chief Justice of
Manitoba said, "The attempt by the Federal power to patriate the constitution
unilaterally may be an act of high statesmanship or of political folly. This is not a
20
determination that we are called upon to make."
20.
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Undeterred by the failure to secure agreement on a number of issues which
could have led to a substantially revised. Constitution embodied in a final amendment to the B.N.A. Act by which the British Parliament would at the same time
terminate the need for its further involvement in the process, the federal government introduced a joint resolution into both Houses of Parliament in October.
After some debate, the resolution was referred to a Joint Committee of both
Houses. After two extensions of time, the Committee reported the resolution back
to both Houses on February 13, 1981, for final debate. This debate was frustrated
by a variety of procedural devices by the Opposition in the House of Commons,
and it was finally agreed that the concluding debate in both Houses on the resolution would be held after the Supreme Court of Canada had ruled on the constitutionality of the resolution. Three provinces (Manitoba, Quebec and
Newfoundland) had challenged the resolution in the courts, and appeals from the
three decisions were heard by the supreme court in May and the decision was
rendered on September 28.21
IV
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE TRUDEAU PACKAGE

In essence, the proposal for constitutional reform embodied the following: the
final termination of the process of amendment by the Parliament of the United
Kingdom ("patriation"); the inclusion in the new Constitution of a Bill of Rights,
embodying both the usual civil and political rights and also the right of minorities
to education in whichever of the official languages is the minority language in the
province in which they live; a constitutional guarantee of the principle of equalization (i.e., that Parliament is obliged to ensure that all provinces are financially able
to provide essential public services "without imposing an undue burden of provincial taxation"); and provision for an amending formula. All of these proposals had
been on the constitutional agenda for years, and many of them have wide support.
One thing is certain, they embody the essential constitutional reforms that Prime
Minister Trudeau has consistently espoused throughout his political life. Objection to the proposals, initially led by a number of provincial premiers, was that the
method departed too abruptly from the intergovernmental consensus which, to
them, appeared to be the central feature of confederation. Nevertheless, the proposals also raise a number of constitutional issues.
Some of these relate to the conventions of the Constitution, rather than to the
law of the Constitution, and thus may not lend themselves to authoritative decision in the courts. The process itself requires the clarification of two such matters,
one relating to the United Kingdom and the other to Canada. The former hinges
on the role of the British Parliament since the Statute of Westminster; section 4 of
that act sought to enshrine an existing convention of the British Constitution that
British acts of Parliament affecting the dominions should be at their request and
with their consent. Does there nevertheless remain a discretion in the British Parliament to refuse or modify such requests, or is its role now purely that of a rubber
21.

Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 125 D.L.R.3d 1 (1981).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 44: No. 3

stamp? Of course in theory no British Parliament is bound by the actions of its
predecessors so that the Statute of Westminster itself could be unilaterally repealed. The authorities differ over whether the Statute of Westminster is a limitation on the sovereignty of the British Parliament, or merely a rule of construction
for the guidance of the courts. 22 Must the British Parliament accept a formal request from Canada, or does it have the right to demur if a province protests that
the proposed amendment violates rights or powers it possesses under the Constitution? Perhaps the one clear conclusion in the whole matter is that British ministers
have repeatedly asserted that the role is automatic and they have in fact regarded
the provinces as not having locus standi to be heard. 23 Nevertheless a situation has
never arisen before when the protest has come from more than one province, and
the fact that as many as eight out of the ten are objecting may have some significance.
This difficulty has not escaped attention in Great Britain. Considerable provincial lobbying in London led the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
British House of Commons to take this factor into account. While these newly
established British Committees have no legislative power, their reports are likely to
have some influence on the British Government, particularly in estimating the degree of parliamentary difficulty which might be encountered. In its first Report of
January 21, 1981, the Foreign Affairs Committee had argued that the British Government still had a responsibility in these matters and should refuse to implement
the proposed amendment if it thought it was procedurally defective. 24 This position was clarified in a second Report, dated April 15, when they emphasized that
what they meant was not to pass judgment on the substance of the request but
only on whether the request was made "in a proper manner". 2 5 They concluded
that "the UK Parliament need not automatically accede to the request unless the
request is made with an appropriatelevel and dstr'bution of Provincialconcurrence. " In
their view the proposal had not followed the federal principle and was thus
tainted.
The British Select Committee thus touched on the question of internal procedure in Canada. The Statute of Westminster does not say who has the authority
to make requests for constitutional amendment. Some early ones were made at the
request of the federal government alone. The practice in general for the past century has been for the request to be embodied in a joint resolution of the Senate and
House of Commons. 26 Whether the practice that the provinces have to be consulted in matters affecting them, and have to agree to the proposed amendment,
had hardened into a convention of the Constitution, was by no means clear. If a
convention is absolutely clear and certain the courts may assimilate it into the law
of the constitution. As Sir Kenneth Wheare put it, if a court recognizes a constitutional custom "as it will apply it in the determination of a dispute before it, then
22.

K. WHEARE, THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER AND DOMINION STATUS 153 (5th ed. 1953).

23.
24.
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P. GERIN-LAJOIE, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA 138 (1950).
H.C., FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., FIRST REPORT, SESSION 1980-1981 (Jan. 21, 1981).
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26.
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that custom has ceased to be a nonlegal rule, and has joined the body of law
strictly so called."' 27 Alternatively, a court may recognize that a convention has
been established but not go so far as to apply it as a judicial rule in the determination of a case. Both of these possibilities were implicit in the references to the three
provincial courts of appeal, which in essence posed three questions: do the Trudeau proposals affect provincial powers; is there a convention that such amendments will not be proceeded with without provincial consent; and is provincial
consent a legal requirement of the Constitution? The answers of the three provincial courts of appeal were various. The Manitoba court upheld the position of the
federal government in a 3-2 decision, 28 and the Quebec court reached the same
conclusion by a majority of 4-1,29 while the Newfoundland court was unanimous
in supporting the provincial position.3 0 In the Supreme Court of Canada the appeals from the three decisions were taken together, even though the questions were
somewhat differently worded.
It should be noted that the merits of the specific parts of the Trudeau proposals
were not directly before the courts in the various references. Nevertheless it was
the proposals themselves, as much as the procedure, which in varying degrees stiffened the resistance of the various provincial governments to the whole process.
A major constitutional issue created by the Trudeau constitutional proposals
concerns the "entrenchment" of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. The effect of
the Bill of Rights is, of course, to set up a constitutional barrier against legislation
by either level of government which transgresses its norms. As the dissenting provinces see it, the effect of this is to take away legislative powers which they now
possess under the Constitution without their consent. The federal reply is that,
whatever the Bill of Rights does, it does not alter the federal balance of the Constitution since it equally restrains both levels of government from abusing their legislative powers in an unconscionable manner. For public consumption the Bill of
Rights is described as a "people package" which has nothing to do with the distribution of power in the Constitution.
Probably the most sensitive part of the Bill of Rights is the part which deals
with minority language rights. It reasserts existing constitutional rights to the use
of French and English in the legislatures and court of Canada, Quebec and Manitoba (and adds New Brunswick at its request), it entrenches the federal Official
Languages Act (which entitles Canadians to be served by the federal government
in either of the two official languages), and it puts into the Constitution the right
of linguistic minorities of either language group to educate their children in that
language. This would not only provide a constitutional guarantee of such rights
where Francophones are already a substantial minority, and already fairly well
served in practice, as in New Brunswick and Ontario, but create an obligation of a
new sort on provinces where such minorities are smaller. In Quebec, where the
substantial recognition of minority school rights in the English language depends
supra note 22, at 2.
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on constitutional guarantees to religious minorities, this right would be reasserted
on the firmer ground of language. The effect, when this part is intended to come
into force (three years after the coming into effect of the new Constitution Act),
would be to nullify an important part of Quebec's language law, commonly called
Bill 101. 3 1 That Act declared French to be the official language of Quebec and
extended the right of schooling in English only to children of parents educated in
that language in Quebec. To the present government of Quebec, which regards
this legislation as the keystone of its policy of protecting the survival of the French
language and culture, the Bill of Rights presents a potent threat to its essential
powers under the Constitution.
The objection to the Bill of Rights in the western provinces is of a different
order. To the Premier of Manitoba, and to perhaps a lesser extent to the others,
an entrenched Bill of Rights is a direct challenge to constitutional values. He adheres to the traditional English common lawyers' view, once so fully articulated by
Dicey, that the rights of the citizen are best protected by the common law and not
by putting the courts in a position to erode the sovereign power of the legislature
which is the foundation of the Westminster system of government. To this argument many Westerners would add that taking power from the people's representatives and giving it to the courts is to negate democratic principles by transferring
the power to prescribe the basic values of the community from elected representatives to nonelected judges. To them it is a confrontation between democratic and
elitist values.
The Trudeau proposals have involved a third area of contention by the inclusion of an amending formula. Obviously any attempt at patriation would have to
deal with this matter, since there is no point in leaving the situation in limbo with
no authoritative method for making changes in the future. The Trudeau solution
was to adopt, as an interim measure, the formula so nearly achieved at the Victoria Conference in 1971, which in essence required the consent of the Parliament of
Canada, of any province having 25 percent of the population (.e. Ontario and
Quebec), and at least two of the four provinces having at least 50 percent of the
population in each of the other regions (Western Canada and the Atlantic provinces). If they had been content with this proposal there would have been some
objection, but probably not from most of the provinces. However, the Trudeau
package included a number of controversial additions. A new amending formula
could be adopted by unanimous consent within two years. There were further
provisions which suggested the possibility that amendments and the amending
procedure could be secured by the use of referenda if provincial governments
proved to be recalcitrant. Provincial governments as well as those who dislike referenda on principle objected to these provisions. The provinces feared that their
positions, supported by their legislatures, could be overridden by referenda which
were not under their control. The amending formula proposed by the federal government also included a new provision (since dropped) which would have given
the Senate a suspensive rather than an absolute veto in the amending process. The
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reason for this was the ongoing constitutional discussions in recent years which
have included proposals for a radical revision of the role and composition of the
32
Senate in the federal system.
Every discussion of constitutional reform since 1927 has ended in disagreement.
In the present case the federal government is seeking to break out of the stalemate
by taking the initiative in hopes that the force of public opinion will neutralize the
opposition. It is fairly clear that they foresaw that the furious round of preparatory negotiations would fail, and that the first ministers would not reach agreement in September. Meanwhile they had armed themselves with an outside legal
opinion from counsel that there were no legal barriers in the way. In this respect
the federal government has been vindicated in the supreme court.
The question arises as to why the federal government-to shorten the legal
debate--did not launch a preemptive strike of its own by referring the matter
directly to the Supreme Court of Canada by way of reference. This would have
had the advantage, often useful, of enabling them to frame their own questions.
The answer to this, given early in the discussion by a federal minister and reiterated since by the Prime Minister, is that such a course would have indicated that
they had doubts about the legality of their course. There is, however, another
question besides legality involved, and that is propriety.
Critics of the federal action are prone to quote from an earlier Minister of
Justice, the Hon. Guy Favreau, who in proposing the aborted formula of 1965
said:
The Constitution cannot be changed in a way that might deprive the provinces of their
legislative powers unless they consent. The law has not said so, but the facts of national life
have imposed the unanimity requirement, and experience since Confederation has estab33
lished it as a convention that a government or Parliament would disregard at its peril.

Why was "a fact of national life" in the considered view of the Government of
Canada in 1965 no longer a fact of life in 1981? In part the answer is that what
was a matter of reconciling conflicting, but not utterly opposed, interests between
the two levels of government is now a conflict not so easily reconciled between two
views of Canada. This conflict was characterized by Prime Minister Trudeau as
one between those who regarded Canadian federalism as something less than the
sum of its parts and those who think that it is something more. The speeches of
some premiers make it clear that Canada is, to them, a confederal arrangement in
which the provincial components are the integral units and the federal government is merely charged with limited common responsibilities by them. This view,
needless to say, is that of the Quebec government, which claims within its territory
to be the only legitimate government for Quebeckers. Against this view there is
ranged a federal government with a firm majority in the House of Commons (a
comparatively rare thing these days) imbued with a sense that the Canadian system has become already "the most decentralized federal system in the world" at a
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time when economic conditions require central governments with the power and
authority to take strong measures.
The extent to which the protagonists are willing to resort to the courts is evidence of the escalation of the conflict. It has been noted that this was an expedient
to be avoided at all cost during the height of executive federalism, when both sides
gained sufficiently by negotiation to make the risks of litigation too high to be
considered. Furthermore, a major role in determining what the Constitution
means is not one that Canadian judges relish. They do not see themselves as legislators.3 4 Their preferred role, to which they are suited by temperament and training, is that of "black-letter" lawyers immersed in the niceties of statutory
interpretation and eschewing broad principles when a narrow construction will
suffice. This is illustrated in their handling of cases under the Canadian Bill of
Rights of 1960-a federal law which appears to override any federal law that is
inconsistent with it. With few exceptions they have held that the rights asserted
can be remedied under the provisions of another statute, such as the Criminal
Code, so that it becomes unnecessary to consider the wider question of whether the
Bill of Rights applies. 35 Addressing themselves to fundamental questions of constitutional values is not a congenial prospect.
In taking this position it is probable that they have some wisdom on their side.
It is likely that the Supreme Court of Canada is aware that its authority in such
matters is fairly tenuous. The entrenchment and/or reform of the court has been
on the public agenda for years. There are even influential advocates, particularly
in Quebec, of the establishment of a purely constitutional court; constructed on
"representative" lines. Such a court, if it divided (as it might well) according to
the value differences of its various constituencies, would only exacerbate the very
differences it was established to settle. Furthermore, constitutional law is not readily separated form other branches of law, and issues of substantial constitutional
import are likely to arise as part of a wide variety of what are nominally civil
disputes. The present court appears to be going out of its way to avoid being split
on issues of constitutional principle. Sometimes these are unavoidable, as was the
case in the Anti-Inflation case, 36 which brought out two Francophone judges in
strong dissent from the majority of the court. Apparently a successful closing of
the ranks was achieved in the Senate Reference,aT where the court took the unusual
step of issuing "for the Court" a unanimous and unattributed judgment.3 8 There
were undoubtedly efforts to achieve the same result in the questions on the constitutional amending resolution, but they failed. However, in any event the three
judges from Quebec were not isolated but were incorporated into the majority.
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Something should be said at this point about reference cases. The Parliament
of Canada and all provincial legislatures have made provision for the executive to
seek advisory opinions from the courts. About one-third of judicial rulings on Canadian constitutional questions have in fact been based on such references. Since
there is no strict separation of powers in the Canadian Constitution, there is no
constitutional barrier to this device, which is not available as far as the Supreme
Court of the United States is concerned, and has been also rejected by the High
Court of Australia 39 Such decisions may not be as authoritative as decisions arising out of normal litigation, but they have in fact been treated as equally authoritative by Canadian courts. A direct reference to an appellate court has the
obvious advantage of cutting short the period of legal doubt which would be created while a case wound its way slowly up the hierarchy of courts. It has two
disadvantages. It is disliked by the judiciary because it compels them to reach a
decision in the absence of the wider range of considerations which would be a
visible if they had a real dispute between parties over the text of an actual law (a
reference case may involve not only general questions but often an actual bill or
statute). The second disadvantage is that it confers a special advantage on the
executive simply because the answer one gets depends to some extent on the wording of the question which is asked.
In 1981 the reference cases decided by the Manitoba, Quebec and Newfoundland courts, which raised the three crucial questions were heard and decided. The
Supreme Court of Canada, having heard argument on the appeals at the end of
April, mulled over the questions over the summer and finally delivered judgment
on September 28.40 The court had no difficulty with the first question. They were
unanimous in finding that the Trudeau proposals did in fact affect the rights and
powers of the provinces. 4' On the second question the court was divided. The six
justices in the majority found that there was indeed a constitutional convention
which had been established that substantial provincial consent must precede a
resolution seeking amendments which affected provincial rights and powers, but
42
unfortunately they failed to "quantify" the degree or kind of consent required.
The three dissenters, including the Chief Justice, found that no such convention
existed. 43 The answer to the third question was divided by the court into two
parts. The majority felt that the proposed amendment package violated the norms
of the Constitution established by convention. 44 Nevertheless, seven of the justices
45
ruled that the federal government's action was legal.

The supreme court's decision has not left the situation much clearer. The court
has found a convention of the Constitution which Canadians did not know existed
(even though the principal actors had apparently conducted themselves in the past
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in conformity with it) in disposing of a case in which one of the principal issues was
an amendment which would have substituted a legal amending formula involving
provincial participation, but they have failed to specify what the convention is.
What number of provinces constitute "substantial" compliance with the convention? Is this provincial consent to be signified by provincial legislatures, or is it
sufficient for governments alone to consent? They do not say. The two judges who
supported both the existence of the convention and the consequence that the
whole thing was illegal were at least consistent, as were the three who found no
convention and no illegality. The four who recognized the existence of the convention and also made up the majority who found the package legal have been responsible for the resulting confusion as to what in fact the court has decided.
The outcome in the first instance has produced a flurry of informal discussions
between the provincial and federal governments in search of a compromise. Will
the eight provinces, or some of them, be willing to reach an accommodation which
the federal government will accept? Perhaps, but at the time that this is written
the outcome does not seem promising. Meanwhile in Great Britain those who had
hoped that the supreme court ruling would dissipate opposition have been disappointed.
V
CONCLUSION

Stripped to its essentials the whole dispute goes to the root of the Canadian
constitutional arrangement. At stake are different views of both the purpose of the
union and the distribution of power within it. For different reasons Quebec and
the western provinces are demanding substantial modifications of the powers of
the federal Parliament over such key matters as communications, commerce and
resource management. One of the strongest bargaining counters possessed by the
provinces has been their power to delay constitutional change. There is no doubt,
for example, that the capacity of the federal government to use its existing powers
to deal with the energy crisis is hampered by jurisdictional disputes over resource
management with the oil producing provinces, which seek a significant surrender
of federal powers. So we are back at the Constitution again.
The most obvious thing about the present impasse, involving a complex balance of political forces, is that the Canadian version of that much talked about
problem of "ungovernability" is taking its usual Canadian form-a debate about
the constitution. No constitution can work if the political system cannot manage
conflict within an accepted set of rules and appropriate institutions to settle disputes. The First Ministers' Conference had failed as a device for solving the constitutional impasse on patriation and the amending formula. There seems little
likelihood that it can successfully manage the more complex problem of jurisdictional modification required by both western and Quebec demands. Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Canada-in a decision which both sides won and both sides
lost- demonstrated again that clear and authoritative answers from the courts are
hard to get when political cleavages run deep and value conflicts seem to defy
reconciliation.

